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abstract
This paper develops an error components model that is used to examine the impact of 
job changes on the dynamics and variance of individual log earnings. I use data on work 
histories drawn from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), that makes possible to 
do the distinction between voluntary an involuntary job-to-job changes. The potential en-
dogeneity of job mobility in relation to earnings es circumvented by means of an instrument 
variable estimation method that also allows to control for unobserved individual-job specific 
heterogeneity.
Keywords: Panel data, dynamic models, individual-job specific fixed effects, job changes, 
individual wages.
JEL classification: C23, J31.
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1 Introduction
A large literature on labour economics has focused on the determinants of wages. On the one hand,
studies based on the human capital theory (Becker, 1975) examine the impact of general experience on
wages, ignoring job mobility. On the other hand, studies based on job search and matching theories
(Burdett, 1978; Jovanovic, 1979) or purely learning by doing (Rosen, 1972), look at the eect of job
specic human capital on wages. This literature has focused on estimating the returns to experience and
tenure1, trying to control for the endogeneity of tenure using dierent methods2.
Another related literature on earnings dynamics has modelled and estimated the heterogeneity and
time series properties of individual wage processes ( Lillard and Willis, 1978; MaCurdy, 1982; Abowd
and Card, 1989; Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004), but many have ignored job mobility and the distinction
between dynamics within and between jobs. However, job mobility may aect the mean but also the
shape of the distribution of earnings and, moreover, this eect may last for several periods after the job
change.
The relationship between job mobility and earnings dynamics is economically relevant as, for instance,
transitions into poverty may increase dramatically following a job loss, but also because job mobility
may have an equalizing role over the life-cycle inequality, depending on whether workers are more o less
able to improve their economic situation by changing jobs.
In Hospido (2009), I consider a model for the heterogeneity and dynamics of the conditional mean and
the conditional variance of individual wages. In the empirical analysis - conducted on data drawn from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) - I nd that it is important to account for individual unobserved
heterogeneity and dynamics also in the conditional variance, and that the dynamics are driven by job
mobility. In line with those results, this paper develops a model that explicitly considers job changes in
the dynamics of wages and in the heterogeneity pattern. In particular, the specication proposed has two
1See, for example, Altonji and Shakotko (1987), Topel (1991), Topel and Ward (1992), Neal (1995), Altonji and Williams
(1997), Dustmann and Meghir (2005), among others.
2A rst group of studies uses a single wage equation and then applies instrument variable or control function methods
to control for the endogeneity bias (Altonji and Shakotko, 1987; Topel, 1991; Altonji and Williams, 1997; Dustmann and
Meghir, 2005). A second approach exploits information on rm closures (Neal 1995, Bonhomme and Jolivet, 2006). A third
group suppose that workers’ mobility decisions produce realized wage rates that are not random samples of the oered
wage rates and estimate the returns to tenure taking into account the sample selection process (Topel, 1986; Marshall and
Zarkin, 1987). Finally, other studies explicitly specify a simultaneous equation model with wage rate and job tenure as
dependent variables, based upon a model in which they are jointly determined (Lillard, 1999; Abowd and Kang, 2002;
Bagger, 2007; Amann and Klein, 2007).
1
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 10 documenTo de TRabajo n.º 0907
dierent parameters to capture dynamics within jobs and across jobs, and the unobserved heterogeneity
shows a richer pattern as well, composed of both individual and job-specic eects.
As pointed out by Low et al. (2008), it is important to distinguish between movements in earnings
that reect choice and those which reect uncertainty. Those authors address this issue by allowing for
endogenous labour supply and job mobility which implies that a proportion of earnings uctuations,
usually interpreted as risk, are in fact attributed to choice. Here, the potential endogeneity of job
mobility in relation to earnings is circumvented using an instrument variable estimation method that
controls for individual and job-specic unobserved heterogeneity.
A recent empirical literature (Stevens, 2001; Leonardi, 2003) examines the contribution of job changes
to the increasing male earnings inequality in the United States since the 1970. Following Gottschalk
and Mo!tt’s 1994 and 1995 studies, these references have focused on the transitory component of the
earnings variance (earnings instability). The problem with the models that they consider is that they
are incapable of incorporating the eect of job mobility on permanent income because they parameterize
permanent income as a xed individual eect. However, this is a simplication as job mobility may also
aect permanent income. In this paper, dierently to Berry et al. (1988), Stevens (2001), and Leonardi,
2003, I explicitly consider job-specic eects as well as individual unobserved characteristics, that is,
the individual eects are time invariant whereas the job-specic or match eects change across jobs
but remain constant within the same position3. Dierently to Lillard (1999), Abowd and Kang (2002)
and Low et al. (2008), I adopt a xed eects perspective leaving the distribution for the unobserved
heterogeneity components completely unrestricted and treating each eect as one dierent parameter to
be estimated.
The paper contributes to the literature by more thoroughly describing the impact of job mobility on
the dynamics and heterogeneity of individual wages than previous references. In particular, the proposed
model: (i) permits that job changes may be correlated with individual and job specic unobserved
characteristics, (ii) is agnostic regarding the distribution of these individual and job eects, (iii) can
be estimated with no need to explicitly model the job mobility process, and (iv) allows us to calculate
dierent components of the variance within and across jobs.
3The importance of match eects in explaining wages has been stressed by Topel and Ward (1992), Abowd et al. (1999),
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and Bonhomme and Jolivet (2006).
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In the empirical application, I use data on work histories drawn from the 1968-1993 PSID. These
data allow me to establish the distinction between voluntary job-to-job changes (quits) and involuntary
job-to-job changes (job losses). In the sample, once we control for individual and job-specic eects, the
persistence within jobs is almost zero, whereas across jobs is signicant but small. For the dynamics,
the distinction between voluntary and involuntary transitions turns out to be irrelevant. However, this
distinction matters in terms of risks. The estimated variance of the job-specic eects represents around
one third of the variance for the individual xed eects. However, if I consider a subsample that only
includes involuntary job changes, the estimated variability across jobs increases up to two thirds with
respect to the individual time-invariant component.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 presents the
model. Section 4 explains the estimation strategy and section 5 shows the estimation results. Finally,
section 6 concludes with a future research agenda.
2 The Data
The data come from the PSID for the period from 1968 to 19934. The PSID began in 1968 by inte-
viewing over 5,000 families. Of these, about 3,000 families were representative of the US population as
a whole (the core sample), and about 2,000 were low-income families (the Census Bureaus SEO sam-
ple). Thereafter, these same families have subsequently been interviewed every year, as have any new
families formed from the original group of families5. The survey contains abundant information on indi-
vidual characteristics, income and labour market status. The data set should follow individuals over a
su!ciently long period of time to observe pre- and post- job changes earnings histories.
4Several changes have been implemented to the PSID since the mid-1990s. The most important is that the PSID
switched to biannual interviewing in 1997. In addition, I exclude the 1994-1997 income les because, as explained by Kim
et al. (2000), the continuity of the PSID data in those years was disrupted by a major revision of the survey that included
a switch to computer-assisted telephone interviewing and to automated editing of the data, and changes in the structure
of the income questions.
5A family member who moves out of a PSID family is eligible for interviewing as a separate family unit if he or she is
a sample member and he or she is 18 years old or older and living in a dierent, independent household.
3
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2.1 Sample Construction
In the empirical analysis, I use the core sample. I restrict my study to heads of households6 since, during
the sample period, survey questions regarding employment history are only asked to them7. In addition,
to focus the analysis during the working life, I select males aged 25 to 55, with no missing records on
race, education, region of residence or, if appropriate, reason of job change. I drop the self-employed,
those with topcoded wages, and those with less than 8 years of usable data on earnings. Finally, I have
an unbalanced panel that contains 2,013 individuals and 27,845 observations from 1968 to 1992.8
Step-by-step details on sample selection are reported in Appendix A. Sample composition by year,
individuals by number of observations and demographic characteristics are presented in Appendix B.
2.2 Job Changes Denition
A job change takes place when current tenure of the worker is less than a year and there is information
available regarding the type of change. The type of change is dened by the answer to the question:
“What happened to the job you had before - did the company go out of business, were you laid o,
promoted, or what?”. Therefore, I dene a job change as an involuntary job separation or job loss in
case of business or plant closing or due to being laid o or red; and as quit, in case of voluntary change.
The question quoted above was only asked to individuals who report being with their present employer
for less than twelve months (otherwise the question is skipped and coded as not applicable), so this make
me feel condent regarding the variable tenure9. As pointed out by Polsky (1999), from 1984 to 1988
this question was asked to all respondents who reported that their current job started after January of
the previous year. To correct for this possible inconsistency, no job change is reported for those with
current tenure greater than one year.
The sample only includes job-to-job changes, because monthly calendar information, that would
provide information regarding spells of unemployment lower than a year, is not available before 1984.
6A household head is dened as the adult of the family. When there is more than one adult in the family, the PSID
assigns the primary male adult as the household head.
7The same information is available also for wives only from 1979.
8 In practice, I use information only until 1992 because, in every survey wave, the time reference for wage records is the
previous year.
9 Since the PSID does not collect information on specic employers, the identication of job changes in this data set has
been quite controversial. Many of the di!culties related to measuring job tenure in the PSID were evaluated by Brown and
Light (1992). The tenure question also switched from being coded in intervals prior to 1976 to being measured in months,
and from asking about position tenure to employer tenure. In any case, these di!culties are not so important here since I
am not interested in the exact value of the variable but if tenure is less or more than one year.
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For all groups the main reason for leaving job is quitting, but the dierence with respect to layo is
more important for graduate and - specially - for college people than for dropouts.
Job mobility and earnings dynamics In order to get a rst impression of the impact that job
changes have over the evolution of earnings, I calculate the cross-sectional sample correlations for con-
secutive logwage observations on years when no-change, a job loss or a job quit has happened11. Table 2
summarizes those calculations that work also as a check for the denitions above. As we would expect,
when a job change occurs the correlation diminish, and that reduction is bigger in case of job loss than
in case of a voluntary job change.
Table 2. Sample Correlations across Individuals
Correlations No-change at time w Job loss at time w Job quit at time w
(zlw3> zlw2) 0.902 0.863 0.873
(zlw2> zlw1) 0.905 0.689 0.853
(zlw1> zlw) 0.903 0.590 0.748
(zlw> zlw+1) 0.886 0.816 0.893
(zlw+1> zlw+2) 0.866 0.817 0.857
Table 3 displays average annual wage growth for workers within jobs and between jobs by type of
exit. Within-job annual wage growth is lower than between-job annual wage growth in case of voluntary
transitions. In case of job loss, real wages drop. I nd the same qualitative patterns among dierent
demographic groups.
Table 3. Sample Wage Annual Growth
Wage growth Within job Job loss Job quit
All 0.010 -0.101 0.035
(0=271) (0=716) (0=444)
Wokers?35 0.021 -0.022 0.075
years old (0=268) (0=725) (0=398)
Wokers35 0.002 -0.164 0.013
years old (0=272) (0=703) (0=503)
Dropout 0.001 -0.113 0.012
(0=332) (0=810) (0=506)
Graduate 0.009 -0.098 0.076
(0=258) (0=661) (0=480)
College 0.024 -0.074 0.1022
(0=203) (0=680) (0=457)
Note: standard deviation in parentheses.
11Nominal annual earnings are deated by the GNP Personal Consumption Expenditure Deator (base 1992).
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As pointed out by Dustmann and Meghir (2005), the fact that within-job wage growth is lower than
between-job wage growth does not imply that, on average, job quitters have higher wages than stayers.
As they did, I regress log wages on dummies for the number of jobs workers have held up to then, also
including age and year dummies.
Table 4. Log wages on number of jobs
Number OLS Fixed eects
of jobs All Voluntary Involuntary All Voluntary Involuntary
movers movers movers movers
2 -0.017 0.069 -0.371 0.020 0.082 -0.177
(1=89) (7=13) (20=45) (2=84) (10=80) (11=90)
3 -0.044 0.128 -0.442 0.068 0.195 -0.146
(3=94) (9=00) (16=23) (7=45) (17=92) (6=93)
4 -0.076 0.146 -0.597 0.074 0.227 -0.329
(5=18) (7=13) (9=86) (6=29) (14=92) (7=81)
5 -0.139 0.119 -0.740 0.076 0.258 -0.338
(6=67) (3=45) (6=25) (5=07) (11=66) (4=68)
6 -0.175 0.282 -1.305 0.118 0.356 -1.166
(6=41) (5=42) (2=41) (6=31) (11=00) (4=37)
7 -0.391 0.110 -0.997 0.028 0.268 -0.841
(9=62) (1=44) (1=84) (1=07) (6=03) (3=15)
Note: t-ratios in parentheses. All regressions include age and time dummies.
Estimates for the rst seven jobs, reported in the rst column of Table 4, indicate that workers with
more jobs have lower wages. Once I include individual xed eects in the regression (column 4), the
number of jobs is positively related with wages. In fact, if I exclude from the sample movers who transit
only through job loss (columns 2 and 5), I obtain a positive relationship between number of jobs and
wages. On the contrary, if I exclude those who change voluntary (columns 3 and 6), I obtain that workers
with more jobs have lower wages even after including individual xed eects.
3 The Model
In this section I propose an empirical model to study the dynamics of individual earnings over time,
within a job and over the career of a worker in one or more dierent jobs.
8
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3.1 Basic Specication
Building on the autoregressive model developed in Lillard and Willis (1978), for a worker l and time w,
I consider the following more general specication
|lw = |lw1 + glw1|lw1 + l + !l(w) + lw; (w = 2> ==> Wl)> (1)
where {|l1> ===> |lWl1}
Q
l=1 are the observed log earnings data, glw is an indicator of working l ending
current job12 at time w, the parameter  or, alternatively,  +  measures the persistence on the level
of those earnings to shocks, lw is a purely transitory component, l is an unobserved time-invariant
individual component, like ability, and !l(w) is an unobserved individual-job component, such that,
• it remains constant whithin a position: !l(w) = !l(w1) if glw1 = 0, but
• it is dierent across jobs: !l(w) 6= !l(w1) if glw1 = 1.
In particular, for a worker l that is observed for Wl periods always at the same job, the model would
be the classical DU(1) process with individual xed eects
|lw = |lw1 + l + !l + lw = |lw1 + l + lw=
Notice that I abstract from additive aggregate eects by regarding |lw as a deviation from a time
eect13 .
The model in (1) departs from the standard one in two main features related to job mobility:
1. The dynamics captured by the autoregressive parameters is dierent in years when workers change
job, + > than within the same job, .
2. The unobserved heterogeneity across individuals has a job-specic matching component. In other
words, I consider individual and job specic eects, l + !l(w)=
12 I should formally have a m subscript for job on wages but since it does not add clarity I have dropped it.
13As is usual in the earnings dynamics literature, the variable |lw - strictly speaking - represents log earnings residuals
from rst stage regressions on some observed variables -apart from year dummies (that capture the aggregate conditions
of the economy) - as age, race and other individual characteristics. So we would keep in mind the following structure:
zlw = {lw + xlw
xlw = l +  lw
 lw =  lw31 + lw
where zlw is the log annual wages of an individual l in period w> {lw is a vector of exogenous variables, and xlw is a random
error with two components , an unobserved individual heterogeneity component and an autoregressive component. The
connection with the specication above would be |lw = xˆlw and l = (13 )l=
9
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Given the model, within job, the transitory shocks will be uncorrelated with lagged earnings, but
not with present or future earnings. Similarly, I do not need to assume the strict exogeneity of the
job changes, in the sense of being uncorrelated to past, present, and future time-varying shocks. Apart
from possibly being correlated with the unobserved heterogeneity components, I will consider that job
changes may be predetermined, that is, they might be correlated with errors at certain periods but not
at others. In particular, we could think of glw as a function of the past errors and individual observed
and unobserved characteristics - that is, the individual’s work history - but as being uncorrelated to
present and future shocks. Formally, I am imposing that
H
¡
lw||w1l > gwl
¢
= 0=14 (2)
Although it would be preferable to also allow for correlation between glw and lw> that would lead
us to consider selection models which is out of the scope of the paper. Even so, the model proposed
here has several advantages. First, it permits the estimation of a specication in which job changes can
be correlated with individual and job specic characteristics with no need to explicitly model the job
mobility process or to do any assumption regarding the distribution of these individual and job eects.
Moreover, note that neither time series or conditional heteroskedasticity are assumed. Therefore, as
before, we could consider unobserved heterogeneity components in those conditional variances, both at
the individual and job-specic level.
3.2 Specication by Type of Exit
In the empirical analysis I will also consider an extended specication that reects dierent dynamics
across individuals and time according to the type of job change
|lw = |lw1 + og
orvv
lw1|lw1 + tg
txlw
lw1|lw1 + l + !l(w) + lw> (3)
where gorvvlw is a dummy variable equal to one if worker l at time w ends current job due to an involuntary
job separation or job loss; and gtxlwlw equal one if worker l at time w ends current job because she has
decided to moved to a new job.
I consider the kind of individual and stochastic eects which preserve the same properties as the
basic specication.
14 In the sequel, for any random variable (or vector of variables) ], }lw denotes observation for individual l at period w,
and }wl = {}l1> ===> }lw}, i.e. the set of observations for individual l from the rst period to period w=
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4 Identication and Estimation Method
In this section I discuss the conditions under which I achieve parameter identication. In the model, wages
are observed conditional on individuals working; within-job wages, which identies the parameter , are
only observed if the individual does not change job; between-job wage growth, which helps to identify
dierences on dynamics on years of change, , is observed only for job movers. Further, participation
and mobility decisions can be all endogenous and if this is ignored we risk biasing the estimates of the
model15. Regarding participation, given the type of individuals considered in the sample, it does not
seem such a big issue in this setting so I will ignore it. The potential endogeneity of job mobility is
circumvented by controlling for possibly correlated individual and job-specic heterogeneity, without
observing it, and by means of a instrument variable estimation method16.
4.1 Orthogonality Conditions
As a matter of notation, I assume that the rst observation occurs at w = 1, so that the earnings equation
(1) rewritten in rst dierences is dened from w = 3
|lw = |lw1 +  (glw1|lw1) +
³
!l(w)  !l(w1)
´
+lw; (l = 1> ===Q ; w = 3> ==> Wl)=
Given (2), the following moment conditions hold
H
¡
|w2l (1 glw1)lw
¢
= 0; (w = 3> ==> Wl)> (4)
and so
H
¡
|w2l (1 glw1) (|lw  |lw1   (glw1|lw1))
¢
= 0=
Then, we can consider a GMM estimator for  = (> )0 that used all the available lags at each period
as instruments for the equations in rst dierences (Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen, 1988; Arellano and
Bond, 1991). Notice that GMM estimation will only consider the moment conditions with glw1 = 0>
and that  would be identied thanks to those with glw1 = 0 but glw2 = 1=
15As pointed out by Low et al. (2008) this, implicitly, has been the assumption made in papers estimating the covariance
structure of earnings (MaCurdy, 1982; Abowd and Card, 1989; Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004).
16Low et al. (2008) use a similar sample selection procedure and consider a specication for the wage process fully
parametric. Given the distributional assumption, in the estimation they control for selection into employment and for job
mobility using the Heckman 2-step method. They claim that: “It is clear that what really matters is the rm mobility
decision. Indeed, neglecting the participation correction reduces the variances of interest but the eects are minuscule.”
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4.2 GMM Estimation
The GMM estimator of  based on the corresponding sample moments for (4) with weight matrix DQ is
given by
ˆJPP = argmin

"
QX
l=1
y0l]l
#
DQ
"
QX
l=1
]0lyl
#
>
where yl = |l Zl, with |l = (|l3> = = = > |lWl)
0 > Zl =
3
EC
|l2 gl2|l2
...
...
|lWl1 glWl1|lWl1
4
FD > and
]l =
3
EEEC
|l1 (1 gl2) 0
(|l1> |l2) (1 gl3)
. . .
0 (|l1> = = = > |lWl2) (1 glWl1)
4
FFFD =
According to standard GMM theory, an optimal choice of the inverse weight matrix, YQ = D
1
Q > is a
consistent estimate of the covariance matrix of the orthogonality conditions H(]0lyly
0
l]l). A one-step
GMM estimator uses
Yˆ =
QX
l=1
]0lGG
0]l>
where G is the rst-dierence matrix operator, and a two-step GMM estimator uses the robust choice
Y˜ =
QX
l=1
]0lyˆlyˆ
0
l]l>
where yˆl are one-step residuals.
An estimate of the asymptotic variance of two-step GMM is given by
dY du
³
ˆJPP2
´
=
"Ã
QX
l=1
Z 0l]l
!
Y˜ 1
Ã
QX
l=1
]0lZl
!#1
=
5 Estimation Results
In this section I show the results corresponding to the GMM estimation of the specications presented
in Section 3 (equations 1 and 3). In the estimation, |lw are log annual real wages residuals from rst
stage regressions on year dummies, age, education, dummies for race, region of residence, and residence
in a SMSA17.
17 In earnings dynamics research it is standard to adopt a two step procedure. In the rst stage regression, the log of real
wages is regressed on control variables and year dummies to eliminate group heterogeneities and aggregate time eects.
Then, in the second stage, the unobserved heterogeneity and dynamics of the residuals are modelled.
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5.1 Common Parameters Estimates
I begin by obtaining alternative estimates of a univariate AR(1) model (setting  = 0). Table 5 compares
OLS in levels, rst dierences, and within- groups with those obtaining by GMM, using as instruments
for the equation in rst dierences of the lags of wages up to w 2.
Table 5. Autorregresive Model of Earnings
OLS OLS WG GMM1 GMM2 GMM GMM2
levels dif System AR(2)
|lw1 0.792 -0.313 0.389 0.331 0.321 0 .431 0.329
(0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.023) (0.022) (0.020) (0.025)
|lw2 0.048
(0.014)
m1 - - - 17.25* -14.55* -15.58* -13.83*
m2 - - - 2.09* 1.80 2.91* -0.15
Sargan test - - - - 304.02 369.18* 295.48
(df) (275) (298) (273)
Note: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. m1 and m2 are serial correlation tests
for dierenced errors. * Rejection at the 5 percent.
Taking GMM as a benchmark (columns 4 and 5), OLS in levels is biased upward and OLS in
dierences biased downward, as we would expect for an AR data generating process with individual
unobserved heterogeneity. However, the comparison with the WG is puzzling, since we would also expect
a downward bias in that case. Although the system- GMM estimate is bigger than WG, the Sargan test
rejects the mean stationarity. Finally, the two-step AR(2) estimates reported in the last column do not
change the conclusions, that suggests misspecication as a likely reason for these results18 .
Model in equation (1) diers from the previous standard AR(1) model in two main aspects: the
dierent dynamics within and between jobs and the individual-job specic unobserved heterogeneity.
The rst two columns in Table 6 report GMM estimates (one- and two-step) of the basic specication,
and column 3 corresponds to the two-step GMM estimates of the specication by type of exit. For
comparison, I also include GMM estimates for a specication setting  = 0 (column 4) and another
ignoring job-specic heterogeneity (column 5).
18These results are in line with the ones in Alvarez and Arellano (2004).
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Table 6. Autorregresive Model of Earnings with Job Changes
GMM1 GMM2 GMM2 GMM2 GMM2
Basic Basic By type Same dynamics No job-specic
of exit within and across heterogeneity
|lw1 0.060 0.026 0.018 0.149 0.272
(0.047) (0.043) (0.044) (0.021) (0.048)
glw1|lw1 0.133 0.153 0.096
(0.051) (0.049) (0.086)
gorvvlw1|lw1 0.175
(0.083)
gtxlwlw1|lw1 0.161
(0.066)
m1 -7.52* -7.32* -7.02* -12.51* -14.24*
m2 -0.42 -0.76 -0.76 0.35 1.72
Sargan test - 292.38 291.25 297.59 301.09
(df) (274) (273) (275) (274)
Note: robust t-ratios in parentheses. m1 and m2 are serial correlation tests for dierenced
errors. * Rejection at the 5 percent.
Controlling for individual and job-specic eects, GMM estimates of the AR coe!cient within groups,
, are almost zero; and across jobs, , is signicant but small (columns 1 and 2). The corresponding
estimates for the AR coe!cients when I distinguish between involuntary, o, and voluntary changes, t,
are very close to each other (the dierence is statistically insignicant). If I impose the same dynamics,
both within and between jobs, but still allowing for individual and job-specic eects, the ˆ estimate
increases capturing the eect of job mobility (column 4). Finally, if I ignore the possibility of heteroge-
neous match eects across jobs the results for ˆ and ˆ show a marked discrepancy between columns 5
and 2 (my preferred specication). Although it is not possible to reject the latter specication in terms
of the Sargan test, the variance estimates in the next section suggest that individual heterogeneity across
jobs is not negligible for movers, that is, individuals who change job at least once in the sample.
5.2 Variance estimates
Optimal estimation of 2 and 
2
! requires consideration of the data covariance structure. The errors in
levels, ylw = l + !l(w) + lw> satisfy
Y du (ylw) = Y du
³
l + !l(w)
´
+ 2w > and
Fry(ylw> ylv) = Fry(l + !l(w)> l + !l(v))=
If we assume no sorting, that is, once we have controlled for l it would not make much sense to
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consider correlations across jobs and correlations between individual and job eects, errors would satisfy
Y du (ylw) = 
2
 + 
2
! + 
2
w > and
Fry(ylw> ylv) =
½
2 + 
2
! if same job at time w 6= v>
2 if dierent job at time w 6= v=
Therefore, for large Q simple consistent estimates can be obtained combining cross-sectional sample
covariances as
d³
2 + 
2
!
´
=
W2X
u=1
"
1
W  u  1
WX
w=u+2
1PQ
l=1 Vlwu
QX
l=1
Vlwuyˆlwyˆlwu
#
>
and
b2 =
W2X
u=1
"
1
W  u  1
WX
w=u+2
1PQ
l=1 (1 Vlwu)
QX
l=1
(1 Vlwu) yˆlwyˆlwu
#
>
where Vlwu =
uQ
v=1
(1 glwv) = (1 glw1) · (1 glw2) · = = = · (1 glwu) indicates that individual l stays
at the same job between w u and w> and yˆlw = |lw  ˆ|lw1  ˆglw1|lw1=
Results are reported in Table 7. I nd that in the whole sample (column 1) the estimated variance
of the individual eects is 0.09, very close to the variance of the sum of these and the job-specic eects,
mainly because for the stayers (people who never change job) it is not possible to discriminate among
those two components (column 2). If I only consider individuals that change at least once (column
3), the estimated variance of the job-specic eects represents around one third of the variance for the
individual xed eects. Finally, if I only use those who suer involuntary job changes (column 4) the
estimated variance of the heterogeneity across jobs increases up to one half19 .
Table 7. Wage Variance Estimates
Whole Only Only Only
sample stayers movers layos³
2 + 
2
!
´
0.104 0.094 0.124 0.156
2 0.090 - 0.091 0.104
2! 0.014 - 0.033 0.052
Obs. 19,069 9,064 10,005 2,014
Note: 2 and 
2
! are the variances of the individual and job
eect. ˆ2! is obtained as the dierence between
d³
2 + 
2
!
´
and ˆ2= Obs.: number of sample xˆlw available for calculation.
I drop observations if consecutive changes for the same worker,
and any sample covariance with less than 25 observations.
19 Similar results are found in Berry et al. (1988).
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6 Conclusions
This paper develops an error components model designed to more thoroughly describe the impact of job
mobility on the dynamics and heterogeneity of individual wages than previous references. In particular,
the specication proposed has two dierent parameters to capture dynamics within jobs and across jobs,
and the unobserved heterogeneity shows a richer pattern, as well, composed of both individual and job-
specic eects. The potential endogeneity of job mobility in relation to earnings is circumvented using
an instrument variable estimation method that controls for those unobserved heterogeneity components.
In the data, drawn from the PSID, I nd that - once we control for individual and job-specic eects
- the dynamics within jobs is almost zero, whereas across jobs is signicant but small. For the dynamics,
the distinction between voluntary and involuntary transitions turns out to be irrelevant. However, that
distinction matters in the case of the components of the cross-sectional variance. The estimated variance
of the job-specic eects represents around one third of the variance for the individual xed eects.
If I consider a subsample that only includes involuntary job changes, the estimated variance of the
heterogeneity across jobs increases up to one half.
Further research is needed on the consideration in the model of the labour market participation
decision and, thus, the inclusion of women and transitions job-to-nonemployment and nonemployment-
to-job into the analysis.
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APPENDICES
A Sample selection
Starting point: PSID 1968-1993 Family and Individual - merged les (53,005 individuals).
1. Drop members of the Latino sample (10,022 individuals) = Sample (42,983 individuals).
2. Keep only those who are continuously heads of their households = Sample (16,038 individuals).
3. Keep only males aged 25 to 55 over the period = Sample (8,190 individuals).
4. Drop those with a spell of self-employment = Sample (6,303 individuals).
5. Drop those with missing race, education and region of residence records = Sample (6,047 individ-
uals).
6. Drop those with top-coded earnings records and those with missing earnings = Sample (5,479
individuals).
7. Drop those with outlying earnings records, that is, a change in log earnings greater than 5 or less
than -3 = Sample (5,384 individuals).
8. Drop those with missing records on reason of job change question and those with noncontinuous
data = Sample (5,345 individuals).
9. Keep only those who are in the sample for 8 years or more
= FINAL SAMPLE: Males, 1968-1992 (2,013 individuals and 27,845 observations).
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B Sample composition and descriptive statistics
Table B.1. Distribution of observations by year
Year Number of Year Number of
observations observations
1968 613 1981 1,287
1969 668 1982 1,330
1970 726 1983 1,343
1971 762 1984 1,393
1972 815 1985 1,451
1973 885 1986 1,400
1974 965 1987 1,353
1975 1,046 1988 1,302
1976 1,072 1989 1,258
1977 1,104 1990 1,205
1978 1,146 1991 1,173
1979 1,201 1992 1,096
1980 1,251
Table B.2. Distribution of individuals by number of observations
Number Number of Number Number
of Years Individuals of Years Individuals
8 245 17 84
9 211 18 84
10 153 19 79
11 179 20 68
12 143 21 54
13 151 22 35
14 150 23 41
15 130 24 32
16 112 25 62
Table B.3. Descriptive Statistics
1968 1980 1992
Age 37=16 36=58 40=48
(6=33) (8=82) (5=70)
HS Dropout 0=45 0=26 0=12
HS Graduate 0=40 0=55 0=61
Hours 2> 272 2> 149 2> 197
(524) (502) (489)
Married 0=74 0=80 0=86
White 0=66 0=64 0=69
# Children 2=83 1=45 1=44
(2=08) (1=32) (1=19)
Family Size 4=95 3=60 3=56
(2=03) (1=66) (1=38)
North-East 0=18 0=16 0=17
North-Central 0=26 0=24 0=23
South 0=42 0=46 0=44
SMSA 0=69 0=66 0=54
Note: Standard deviations of non-binary variables
in parentheses.
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